Bacterial Pneumonias during an Influenza Pandemic: How Will We Allocate Antibiotics? by Cinti, Sandro K. et al.
Bacterial Pneumonias during an Influenza Pandemic:
How Will We Allocate Antibiotics?
Sandro K. Cinti, Andrew R. Barnosky, Steven E. Gay, Susan Dorr Goold, Marie M. Lozon, Kristin Kim,
Phillip E. Rodgers, Nancy M. Baum, Bruce A. Cadwallender, Curtis D. Collins, Carrie M. Wright,
and Robert A. Winfield
We are currently in the midst of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and a second wave of flu in the fall and winter could lead to
more hospitalizations for pneumonia. Recent pathologic and historic data from the 1918 influenza pandemic confirms
that many, if not most, of the deaths in that pandemic were a result of secondary bacterial pneumonias. This means that a
second wave of 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza could result in a widespread shortage of antibiotics, making these
medications a scarce resource. Recently, our University of Michigan Health System (UMHS) Scarce Resource Allocation
Committee (SRAC) added antibiotics to a list of resources (including ventilators, antivirals, vaccines) that might become
scarce during an influenza pandemic. In this article, we summarize the data on bacterial pneumonias during the 1918
influenza pandemic, discuss the possible impact of a pandemic on the University of Michigan Health System, and
summarize our committee’s guiding principles for allocating antibiotics during a pandemic.
The current influenza pandemic began with thesimultaneous emergence of a new strain of H1N1
influenza in Mexico and in the U.S. in April 2009.1,2 While
the first wave of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza has been
mild, a second wave this coming fall and winter could be
more severe. This outbreak and the ongoing outbreak of
H5N1 influenza in Southeast Asia have reawakened fears of
a worldwide influenza pandemic of the sort that occurred in
1918.3 The so-called Spanish flu raged throughout the
world, killing 40 to 50 million people in less than a year; an
estimated 500,000 deaths occurred in the U.S.3
In recent years, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and the individual states have
launched substantial efforts to prepare for such an event.4
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One element of preparedness that has been particularly
challenging is determining how scarce resources, such as
influenza vaccine, antiviral medication, and ventilators, will
be allocated. Although many of these resources are being
stockpiled by the states, the federal government, and private
entities, it is unlikely that stockpiling will be sufficient to
avoid severe scarcity in a pandemic. As a result, HHS and
other entities have developed guidelines and priority lists
for antivirals,4 vaccine,4 and ventilators.5,6 However, little
attention has been paid to antibiotics as a scarce resource
during a pandemic; there are 2 reasons for this.
First, as a result of bioterrorism preparedness efforts,
Congress established a Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)
containing antibiotics for Category A biological agents,7
and this stockpile may have created a false sense of security
about the availability of antibiotics during a pandemic.
Unfortunately, the SNS antibiotics are not as effective
against postinfluenza bacterial pneumonias.8 For example,
ciprofloxacin, a major component of the SNS, has poor
activity against community-acquired pneumonia (CAP)
bacteria including Staphylococcus aureus and Streptococcus
pneumoniae, 2 common postinfluenza pathogens.7 Dox-
ycycline, another SNS antibiotic, is recommended only
for outpatient therapy of community-acquired pneu-
monia.8
Second, most of the mortality and morbidity attributed
to the 1918 influenza virus was initially believed to be
mediated through a ‘‘cytokine storm,’’ the body’s immune
response to overwhelming viral infection.9 H5N1 infection
is thought to have a similar disease mechanism.10 This type
of response is best handled either by preventing infection
with vaccine or by giving antivirals when disease occurs.
However, a recent review of historic and pathologic data
from the 1918 pandemic has put the ‘‘cytokine storm’’
theory in doubt and, instead, suggests that most deaths were
a result of secondary bacterial infections.11 Thus, the role of
antibiotics in mitigating the effects of an influenza pan-
demic becomes paramount.
In December 2007, the University of Michigan Health
System’s (UMHS) Pandemic Planning Committee estab-
lished the Scarce Resource Allocation Committee (SRAC) to
develop guiding principles for allocating scarce resources in an
equitable fashion during an influenza pandemic. The SRAC is
composed of experts in ethics, infectious diseases, pediatrics,
internal medicine, intensive care medicine, emergency med-
icine, pharmacy, palliative care, public health, and emergency
management; the committee has been meeting monthly since
its inception. The SRAC recommendations encompass sev-
eral other potential scarce resources, including ventilators,
oxygen, antivirals, vaccine, and staff; however, this article will
focus on our recommendations for antibiotic allocation. This
article is not meant to be an exhaustive review of the diagnosis
and treatment of bacterial pneumonias, as these topics are
covered elsewhere in the literature. We have included sections
on palliative care and public engagement because these are
germane to any discussion about scarce resources.
Bacterial Pneumonias and Influenza
Influenza can predispose a patient to bacterial pneumonias,
and it has been estimated that approximately 25% of deaths
during the influenza season are due to this complication.12
Current evidence suggests that infection with influenza virus
alters the tracheobronchial epithelium and damages cilia,
thereby providing an environment favorable to bacterial
pathogens.13 The most common pathogens associated with
postinfluenza bacterial pneumonia include Streptococcus pneu-
moniae, Staphylococcus aureus, and Haemophilus influenza.14
Community-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus au-
reus (CA-MRSA) has recently emerged as a significant prob-
lem, and an increase in Staphylococcus aureus–associated
deaths following influenza infection has been noted in chil-
dren.15 The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA)
and the American Thoracic Society (ATS) have developed
guidelines for the treatment of community-acquired pneu-
monia, including postinfluenza pneumonias.8 Although the
specifics of these guidelines are beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle, our committee used them to develop recommendations
for allocating antibiotics during a pandemic.
Morens et al. recently reported the results of their study
looking at preserved lung tissue from 58 victims of the
1918 influenza pandemic.11 They also reviewed pathologic
and bacteriologic data from 109 studies that described
more than 8,000 autopsies of 1918 influenza victims.11 The
pathologic characteristics of the 58 lung specimens were
consistent with bacterial pneumonia, demonstrating neu-
trophilic infiltrates in the alveoli. The bacteriologic data
from 96 series showed that more than 95% of lung cultures
had bacteria in them. The authors concluded that the
majority of influenza deaths in the 1918 pandemic were
caused by secondary bacterial infections.11 Brundage and
Shanks reviewed data on the epidemiologic and clinical
characteristics of the influenza victims during the 1918
pandemic.16 They found that most deaths occurred over a
period of 7 to 10 days and sometimes more than 2 weeks
after the onset of symptoms. Also, most pneumonia cases
had bacterial pathogens recovered, and experts of the day
concurred that secondary pneumonias were causing death.
The authors concluded that bacterial pneumonias were
responsible for most deaths.16
Potential Impact of an Influenza
Pandemic on UMHS
The University of Michigan Health System Influenza
Pandemic Preparedness Group used assumptions devel-
oped by HHS to estimate the impact an influenza pan-
demic would have on UMHS.17 For a population of
450,000 people (UMHS catchment) with an infection rate
of 25%, UMHS would have the following level of patient
activity over 8 to 12 weeks:
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 57,000 outpatient visits
 12,500 hospitalizations
 1,900 ICU admissions
 1,700 deaths (3% mortality rate)
It has been estimated that 15% to 20% of influenza
patients developed pneumonia during the 3 pandemics of
the 20th century.18,19 Thus, of the 57,000 outpatients who
present ill with influenza, at least 11,400 can be expected to
develop bacterial pneumonia at some point during their
illness. If each patient requires at least 7 days of antibiotic
therapy (some will require more), UMHS will need ap-
proximately 80,000 doses of antibiotics appropriate to
treating pneumonia. Of the 11,400 patients requiring an-
tibiotics for pneumonia, approximately 4,500 will be in-
patients and will likely need several doses of intravenous
antibiotics. The cost of stockpiling enough antibiotics to
cover all these patients for 7 days is estimated to be over
$600,000 and is prohibitive. Stock rotations to manage
expiration dates would be an additional burden. Further-
more, UMHS cannot rely on the SNS to provide enough
antibiotics, because the program does not stock enough
antibiotics or the appropriate antibiotics to cover postin-
fluenza pneumonias.7 Given these circumstances, the
UMHS Scarce Resource Allocation Committee developed
guiding principles for allocating antibiotics.
Guiding Principles for Allocating
Antibiotics during a Pandemic
Ethical Framework
In developing guiding principles for allocating scarce re-
sources during a pandemic, the Scarce Resource Allocation
Committee adhered to the following ethical framework,
which draws on the literature in ethics and public health:20-22
 Professional obligations to individual patients;
 Professional and institutional obligations of competence;
 Professional and institutional obligations of honesty and
transparency;
 Distributive justice, including equal treatment, utility;
 Fair procedures, including in planning and implementa-
tion; and
 Accountability and legitimacy.
Ethical principles in medicine dictate that a clinician and a
healthcare institution must provide competent care for
individual patients. By this principle, it would be unethical
for a clinician or hospital to withhold antibiotics from a
patient diagnosed with bacterial pneumonia. However, the
principle of distributive justice dictates that resources be
allocated equitably in a population; therefore, changing
antibiotic usage guidelines or even denying antibiotics in
certain situations would be required during a shortage. In
order to balance the individual good with that of a larger
population, fair procedures must be in place well before a
shortage of antibiotics occurs, and these procedures must be
transparent to the public. An alternative allocation system
whereby antibiotics are distributed on a first-come-first-
serve basis until they are gone was felt by committee
members to be unacceptable.
Based on obligations of competence, equal treatment,
and utility, the committee developed strict prohibitions
against the prophylactic use of antibiotics to prevent bac-
terial pneumonia. Only suspected or proven pneumonia
warrants the use of scarce antibiotics. Certain patients at
high risk for mortality from bacterial pneumonia (eg, those
with COPD, renal failure, congestive heart failure, or who
are immunocompromised) might be considered exceptions
if antivirals fail to prevent worsening of respiratory symp-
toms. Generally, antibiotics should be allocated to the
sickest patients and to those who have the greatest likeli-
hood for survival. The committee, therefore, addressed
antibiotic use in the intensive care unit (ICU), the hospital
(including off-site wards), and the ambulatory care setting.
Inpatients and ICU Patients
For the sickest adult inpatients (ICU=ventilated patients),
we recommend distributing antibiotics based on Sequential
Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) scores. A SOFA score is
a rapid method of assessing survival; it relies on oxygena-
tion, blood pressure, platelet count, bilirubin, creatinine,
and Glasgow Coma Score.23 An initial SOFA score is cal-
culated at admission and again at 48 and 96 hours. An
initial SOFA score of >11 predicts a mortality rate of 95%;
a SOFA score <9 predicts a mortality rate of less than
33%.23 At 48 hours, the best predictor of mortality was an
increase (>50% mortality) or decrease (<27% mortality)
in the SOFA score.
The SOFA score has been proposed by several groups as
a way to allocate ventilators during an influenza pan-
demic.4,24 We propose that patients with a SOFA score of
>11 should not receive antibiotics if these are in short sup-
ply; these patients would be considered to require palliative
care. In the ventilator allocation protocol, patients with a
SOFA score >11 are not eligible to be placed on a ventilator
given that they would have a>95% mortality rate. Our com-
mittee felt that such a high mortality should also preclude
administration of antibiotics if they are a scarce resource.
ICU patients with SOFA scores 11 and other hospi-
talized patients should be eligible for antibiotic treatment
but only when pneumonia is highly suspected or proven
based on clinical symptoms, radiologic procedures, and
laboratory data. Patients who are removed from ventilators
and=or placed on a palliative care protocol will no longer
receive antibiotics if they are a scarce resource.
Clinical case definitions of bacterial pneumonia are
available in the literature and will be crucial in allocating
CINTI ET AL.
Volume 7, Number 3, 2009 313
antibiotics.8,25 Early in a pandemic, antibiotics and diag-
nostic tests will be plentiful, but this is the time when strict
adherence to bacterial pneumonia diagnostic and treatment
protocols will be essential. Appropriate antibiotic usage will
delay a scarcity of this resource. During the first wave of the
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, the UMHS Pandemic
Committee developed order sets for inpatients and ICU
patients admitted for flu. These order sets included pro-
tocols for the diagnosis and treatment of bacterial pneu-
monias. While bacterial pneumonias have not been a
significant problem in the first wave, these protocols will be
in place should the situation worsen in the fall.
It is expected that, as the pandemic progresses, diagnostic
and treatment protocols will have to be modified. Clin-
icians will have fewer diagnostic tools (eg, chest X-ray,
blood tests) and may have to rely solely on symptoms and
exam findings when making decisions on the need for an-
tibiotics. Furthermore, the scarcity of certain antibiotics
will necessitate the use of other antibiotics previously
considered second and third line (see Choice of Antibiotics
below).
Outpatients
The outpatient setting presents a particularly daunting
challenge for allocating antibiotics, because the huge
number of patients and the need for rapid triage will tend to
favor overuse of antibiotics. The committee was concerned
that large numbers of people might inappropriately get
antibiotics, including the ‘‘worried well,’’ or people who
have no infection, and those with viral symptoms from
influenza or other viruses who do not have a bacterial in-
fection. In the past, education efforts to reduce inappro-
priate antibiotic use in the ambulatory care setting have
been effective,26 but these will have to be instituted early
and aggressively during a pandemic. Clinical case defini-
tions and guidelines for outpatient therapy should be de-
veloped before a pandemic occurs, and these protocols
should be vetted by multiple clinicians.
Pediatric Patients
The committee felt that more attention must be paid to the
pediatric population in regards to antibiotic allocation.
SOFA scores may not be an accurate measure of survival in
this population. Some experts have proposed using the
Pediatric Logistic Organ Dysfunction (PELOD) scoring
system for allocation of ventilators.27 This scoring system
relies on assessment of 7 organ systems and requires min-
imal lab data (ie, creatinine, arterial blood gas [ABG], white
blood count [WBC], platelet count [plt] and aspartate
aminotransferase [AST], prothrombin time [PT]). A
PELOD score of >26 predicts 100% mortality in a pedi-
atric patient, and such a score would make the patient in-
eligible for antibiotics in accordance with our guiding
principles for adults with poor SOFA scores. Also, different
antibiotics and different doses are required in the pediatric
population. Several common antibiotics for pneumonia,
including flouroquinolones and tetracyclines (doxycycline)
are problematic in children because of their effects on bones
and tendons.28,29 These can be used if no other antibiotics
are available, but special protocols will need to be in place
to guide and protect physicians who administer them.
Choice of Antibiotics
Antibiotic choice based on price and availability will be
inevitable during an influenza pandemic. The use of
cheaper and more available oral antibiotics like doxycycline,
ciprofloxacin, and amoxicillin will be necessary in the
outpatient setting, even if these are less effective than in-
travenous antibiotics (eg, ceftriaxone, vancomycin) and
more expensive oral antibiotics (eg, moxifloxacin, line-
zolid). Ciprofloxacin and doxycycline may be more avail-
able because they are stocked in the SNS and other
repositories such as the Veteran’s Affairs Medical Center
Caches.7,30 Also, in the inpatient setting, a more rapid
transition from intravenous (IV) to oral antibiotics may
need to occur both because of low availability of IV anti-
biotics and a need to discharge patients quickly to free up
hospital bed space. The committee felt strongly that anti-
biotic protocols should be developed well ahead of a pan-
demic in order to guide clinicians both in the hospital and
in the outpatient setting.
The committee agreed that beyond prioritizing antibi-
otics for patients who have a proven or suspected pneu-
monia and are likely to survive, it does not make sense to
stratify people further. Patients with bacterial pneumonias
who go untreated are very likely to get worse and die.
Denying antibiotics to anyone in this situation seems eth-
ically unsound if that person is likely to survive with the
treatment. This is in contrast to the use of antivirals. An-
tivirals, as treatment, would be used in patients with in-
fluenza symptoms regardless of the presence of pneumonia.
Prioritizing these drugs can be justified because most people
(97%) are expected to survive influenza in a 1918-like
scenario with no treatment.17,31 Antiviral treatment is most
likely to be helpful in high-risk groups; thus, HHS has
developed a priority list for these drugs.4
Palliative Care
Although the Scarce Resource Allocation Committee’s
antibiotic allocation strategy does not support the use of
antibiotics for patients who are deemed to be in need of
palliative care, our committee affirmed an ethical duty to
provide aggressive symptom control and support for all
patients, regardless of survival likelihood. Palliative care
protocols will be the key intervention for those expected to
die and should include treatment of dyspnea and related
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anxiety, pain, and other physical symptoms caused by the
underlying illness, as well as psychological, spiritual, and
family counseling to the degree possible. Expert interdis-
ciplinary palliative care teams are now present in a majority
of U.S. hospitals to provide such care routinely, but they are
themselves a scarce resource given that so few of these ex-
perts are present at any particular hospital.
Our committee has proposed implementation of system-
wide pandemic palliative care guideline, based on accepted
national quality standards.32 Key guideline priorities in-
clude developing protocols for symptom relief to be used by
first-line providers, developing strategies for deploying
palliative care personnel, and ensuring adequate supplies of
essential medications, particularly opioids and benzodiaz-
epines, to relieve dyspnea, pain, anxiety, and terminal
restlessness. The fundamental goal is to ensure that patients
get the highest-quality, most appropriate care possible
throughout their course of illness.
Public Engagement about Scarce
Resource Allocation
Public education, discussions, and deliberations about
scarce resource allocation are critical and must occur before
the current pandemic becomes more widespread. Health-
care facilities and public health and emergency manage-
ment organizations in a county, region, and state must
agree on when and how standards of care will be altered
during a pandemic and how resources can best be allocated.
Regarding antibiotic use, changes in established protocols
and guidelines will have to be accepted and followed by all
caretakers in a community. Any appearance of providing
different levels of care could undermine public health ef-
forts to slow the pandemic.
The public must also have a role in discussions about
scarce resource allocation. There is an expectation in our
country that antibiotics are readily available. In fact, many
patients demand these medications for any upper respira-
tory infection.33 Educating the public about the possibility
of antibiotic shortages during a pandemic and about how
public health will respond to these shortages is essential to
prepandemic planning.
The UMHS Scarce Resource Allocation Committee in-
tends to have ongoing discussions with regional and state
entities about allocation issues. As we develop our scarce
resource allocation plan, drafts of our document will be
shared for comment and revision with our state Pandemic
Ethics Committee and the county Health Emergency Re-
sponse Committee (HERC), which includes representatives
from public health, all area hospitals, emergency manage-
ment, the school system, social work agencies, law en-
forcement agencies, and the Red Cross. Furthermore, we
are working with our county public health partners to de-
velop a forum for public discussion on scarce resource al-
location. Such a gathering has already been convened at the
national level by HHS and has proven to be very useful for
planning.34
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